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Abstract
Mathematicians judge proofs to possess, or lack, a variety of different qualities, in-
cluding, for example, explanatory power, depth, purity, beauty and fit. Philosophers of
mathematical practice have begun to investigate the nature of such qualities. However,
mathematicians frequently draw attention to another desirable proof quality: being
motivated. Intuitively, motivated proofs contain no “puzzling” steps, but they have
received little further analysis. In this paper, I begin a philosophical investigation into
motivated proofs. I suggest that a proof is motivated if and only if mathematicians
can identify (i) the tasks each step is intended to perform; and (ii) where each step
could have reasonably come from. I argue that motivated proofs promote understand-
ing, convey new mathematical resources and stimulate new discoveries. They thus have
significant epistemic benefits and directly contribute to the efficient dissemination and
advancement of mathematical knowledge. Given their benefits, I also discuss the more
practical matter of how we can produce motivated proofs. Finally I consider the re-
lationship between motivated proofs and proofs which are explanatory, beautiful and
fitting.
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1 Introduction
Mathematicians judge proofs to possess, or lack, a variety of different qualities. For example,
they may praise a proof for being explanatory, deep, pure, beautiful or fitting. Philosophers
of mathematical practice have attempted to clarify these virtues and explore their benefits.
With respect to mathematical explanation, Steiner (1978) and Kitcher (1989), for example,
have proposed different theories. On Steiner’s approach, an explanatory proof is one which
refers to a “characterizing property” and is, moreover, generalizable (Steiner, 1978, 143–
144). However, according to Kitcher, an explanatory proof is one which is a member of the
most unifying systematization of a set of mathematical beliefs (Kitcher, 1989, §4).1 The
explanatory power of a proof may also connect directly to its depth. For example, Lange
has argued that “depth is constituted (at least partly) by explanatory power” (Lange, 2015,
footnote 1). On the topic of proof purity, Detlefsen and Arana (2011) have offered an anal-
ysis of what they call “topical purity,” and have further argued that proofs which are pure
in this sense have particular epistemic benefits. With respect to mathematical beauty, Rota
(1997) and Cellucci (2015), for example, have argued that beautiful proofs are ones which are
“enlightening” or promote understanding. Finally, Raman-Sundstro¨m and O¨hman (2018)
have identified six senses in which a proof may be said to fit a theorem, and have further
discussed how these senses of fit relate to other virtues, including beauty and explanation.
However, these are not the only qualities that mathematicians judge proofs for possess-
ing or lacking. In particular, mathematicians value proofs that are motivated. Intuitively,
such proofs are perspicuous and do not contain any “puzzling” steps. For example math-
ematicians have had the following to say about motivation (italics added): “To someone
unsteeped in Hermite’s technique the motivation for this proof must be unclear” (Jones,
2010, 556); “The most surprising aspect of this proof is the integral formulas, which have no
apparent motivation” (Cohn, 2006, 59); “The proof of this generalization is simpler and the
steps are better motivated than the proof of the original result”(Corra´di and Szado´, 1993,
4119); “A second purpose [of this paper] is . . . to emphasize that this leads to much more
clearly motivated proofs”(Rogers, 1973, 491).2
Moreover, mathematicians talk about motivated proofs in ways that suggest they have
epistemic benefits. Po´lya’s discussions, for example, indicate that unmotivated proofs have
1Kitcher’s main focus was scientific explanation, but he explicitly noted that his theory applied to math-
ematics as well (Kitcher, 1989, 437).
2See (Morris, 2015, §2.1) for more details and further examples.
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two important deficiencies: (i) they prevent the reader from fully understanding the argu-
ment; (ii) they fail to help the reader tackle her own mathematical problems (Po´lya, 1949,
§3). Motivated proofs, on the other hand, are said to be free from such difficulties. For
example, when discussing two versions of the same proof, one with motivational material
and the other without, Po´lya wrote of the former “Now we may understand how it was hu-
manly possible to discover [a previously puzzling step] . . . The derivation . . . becomes also
more understandable” (Po´lya, 1949, 690). In other words, motivated proofs appear to help
the reader better understand the argument and, by helping her to see how the steps could
have been discovered, put her in a good position to adapt and reuse the ideas in her own
mathematical work.
Although motivated proofs thus feature in mathematical practice and appear to have
epistemic benefits, they have been subject to little analysis. The goal of this paper, then,
is to begin a philosophical investigation into motivated proofs. I start in section (2) by
discussing Po´lya’s work, which I refine and develop into an explication of motivated proofs
in section (3). In order to illustrate how this explication works in practice, I apply it to
a proof of the Cauchy-Schwarz Inequality in section (4) and to a proof of the General
Arithmetic-Geometric Mean Inequality in section (5). In section (6) I analyze the epistemic
benefits that motivated proofs provide, before addressing the more practical matter of how
to produce motivated proofs in section (7). In section (8), I discuss the connection between
motivated proofs and proofs which are explanatory, beautiful and fitting. Finally, in section
(9) I call for an interdisciplinary investigation into motivational power in mathematics.
2 Po´lya on Motivated Proofs
2.1 “With, or Without, Motivation?”
Although there have been few attempts to clarify the notion of motivated proofs, Po´lya’s
paper, “With, or without, motivation?”, serves as a notable exception. While Po´lya did
not present a precise definition of motivated proofs, he offered an example of a perfectly
rigorous but unmotivated proof, discussed why it was deficient, and attempted to improve
it with additional clarificatory material.3 The unmotivated proof that Po´lya analyzed was
of a result called Carleman’s inequality, which states the following (see e.g. (Po´lya, 1949,
684)):
Theorem (Carleman’s Inequality). Let a1, a2, a3, . . . be a sequence of non-negative real
numbers, not all equal to 0. Then
∞∑
n=1
(a1a2a3 . . . an)
1
n < e
∞∑
n=1
an.
To prove Carleman’s inequality, we’ll need to make use of the following three theorems,
whose proofs I omit:4
3Sandborg (1998, 1997) presented a nice discussion of Po´lya’s proof and subsequent analysis with respect
to mathematical explanation.
4A proof of the General Arithmetic-Geometric Mean Inequality will be analyzed in section (5). For
another proof and proofs of the other theorems, see e.g. (Steele, 2004, 20, 29, 30).
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Theorem (Arithmetic-Geometric Mean Inequality (AGMI) ). If a1, a2,. . . , an is a sequence
of non-negative real numbers, then
(a1a2 . . . an)
1
n ≤
a1 + a2 + . . .+ an
n
,
with equality if and only if a1 = a2 = . . . = an.
Theorem (Sum of Telescoping Series (TS) ).
∞∑
n=k
(
1
n
−
1
(n+ 1)
)
=
1
k
.
Theorem (Lower Bound for e (LB) ). For all k = 1, 2, . . . , n, . . .(
k + 1
k
)k
< e.
We can now turn to Po´lya’s unmotivated proof of Carleman’s inequality (see (Po´lya,
1949, 684-685)):5
Proof. Define the sequence c1, c2, c3, . . . by
c1c2c3 . . . cn = (n+ 1)
n,
for n = 1, 2, 3, . . . Note that cn =
(n+1)n
nn−1
. We then have:
∞∑
n=1
(a1a2 . . . an)
1
n =
∞∑
n=1
(a1c1a2c2 . . . ancn)
1
n
n+ 1
(def of ci)
≤
∞∑
n=1
a1c1 + a2c2 + . . . ancn
n(n+ 1)
(AGMI)
=
∞∑
k=1
akck
∑
n≥k
1
n(n+ 1)
=
∞∑
k=1
akck
∞∑
n=k
(
1
n
−
1
n+ 1
)
=
∞∑
k=1
ak
(k + 1)k
kk−1
·
1
k
(def of ck & TS)
=
∞∑
k=1
ak
(
k + 1
k
)k
< e
∞∑
k=1
ak (LB)
5I have edited Po´lya’s proof by including additional details to make it easier to follow.
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As previously mentioned, the above proof is perfectly rigorous, yet unsatisfactory be-
cause it fails to be motivated. Po´lya suggested that the motivational problem lies in the
very first step: the introduction of the ci sequence. As to why, exactly, it is problematic,
he considered a variety of responses:
“It pops up from nowhere. It looks so arbitrary. It has no visible motive or
purpose.”
“I hate to walk in the dark. I hate to take a step, when I cannot see any reason
why it should bring me nearer to the goal.”
“Perhaps the author knows the purpose of this step, but I do not and, therefore,
I cannot follow him with confidence.”
[. . . ]
“Look here, I am not here just to admire you. I wish to learn how to do problems
by myself. Yet I cannot see how it was humanly possible to hit upon your
. . . definition. So what can I learn here? How could I find such a . . . definition
by myself?” (Po´lya, 1949, 685)
The problem with the ci sequence is thus not that the reader cannot verify that it is used
correctly, i.e. that it is used in accordance with the rules of logic. Rather, the first three
quotes suggest that the problem is that the imagined reader will find it difficult to identify
its role in the argument. The fourth quote suggests a related, though different problem: it
is difficult for the intended readers to grasp the insight behind its introduction.6,7
Having diagnosed the problem, Po´lya set out to fix it by providing a rational recon-
struction of how the proof was discovered (Po´lya, 1949, 686-690). This reconstruction helps
readers to better grasp (i) the role that the ci sequence plays in establishing the theorem;
and (ii) the insight that led to its introduction.8 Below I will sketch part of Po´lya’s recon-
6Po´lya did not separate these two problems. Instead, he suggested the problem was that the reader
could not recognize the appropriateness of the ci sequence, where “[a] step of a mathematical argument is
appropriate, if it is essentially connected with the purpose, if it brings us nearer to the goal” (Po´lya, 1949,
685).
7There are strong similarities between Po´lya’s work and Mac Lane’s. For example, Mac Lane remarked
“[. . . ] there is some definite reason for the inclusion of each one of these steps in the proof; that is, each
individual step is taken for some specific purpose” (MacLane, 1935, 125). He further explained “To give a
reason for a step means essentially to show why that step should be taken under the given conditions. In
other words, given the form of the theorem to be proved, a knowledge of the steps already taken in its proof
and a knowledge of the already established theorems which might be used in the next step, why should this
particular step be taken?” (MacLane, 1935, 126).
8There may be a connection linking the distinction between the role of a step and the insight behind it
and the distinction between “how” (or “what”) and “why.” For example we might think of the role of a
step as the answer to the how-question “How does this step work?” or the what-question “What does this
step do?” Further, we might think of the insight behind the step as the answer to the why-question “Why
did the author take this step?” However the connection may not be completely clear cut. For instance,
the insight behind a step could be considered to be the answer to the how-question “How did the author
come up with this step?” or the what-question “What led the author to introduce this step?” rather than a
why-question. Similarly, although the why-question “Why did the author take this step?” can be naturally
interpreted as inquiring after the insight behind a step, it could be interpreted as asking about the role that
it plays instead. That is to say, someone asking this question could be expecting an answer of the form “The
author took this step because it plays role X.”
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struction to bring the role of the sequence and the insight that prompted its introduction
into sharper focus.
First, it helps to know a general heuristic for working with inequalities, which I’ll call
Steele’s heuristic: “Wherever we hope to apply some underlying inequality to a new problem,
the success or failure of the application will often depend on our ability to recast the problem
so that the inequality is applied in one of those pleasing circumstances where the inequality
is sharp, or nearly sharp” (Steele, 2004, 26). In other words, if we are going to apply an
inequality to try to prove a new result, it’s often a good idea to try to apply it when the
inequality becomes (close to) an equality.
Now let’s return to Po´lya’s proof. He begins by noting that we are led to Carle-
man’s inequality when we try to prove a related result, namely that
∑∞
n=1 an <∞ implies∑∞
n=1 (a1a2 . . . an)
1
n <∞. When attempting to prove this, a natural first step would be to
apply the Arithmetic-Geometric Mean Inequality to the sequence a1, a2, . . .. This gives us:
(Po´lya, 1949, 687):
∞∑
n=1
(a1a2 . . . an)
1
n ≤
∞∑
n=1
a1 + a2 + . . .+ an
n
=
∞∑
k=1
ak
∞∑
n=k
1
n
As the last series is divergent, our proof attempt gets us nowhere. The problem is that
the ai sequence we applied the inequality to may have terms which are “very unequal”
(Po´lya, 1949, 687).9 Why is this problematic? Because the Arithmetic-Geometric Mean
Inequality will be (nearly) sharp when and only when the terms of the sequence it is applied
to are (nearly) equal. In other words, applying the inequality directly to the ai sequence is
not applying it where it is most effective, and so it is not surprising that the approach fails.
However, now that we know what the problem is, we can start to think of ways to solve
it. One straightforward way is to introduce a “fudge factor” (Steele, 2004, 28) to make the
terms of the sequence we apply the Arithmetic-Geometric Mean Inequality to more equal.
Thus we are led to the idea of introducing an auxiliary sequence, ci.
The above sketch thus sheds some light on the insight that led to the introduction of
the ci sequence, as well as the role that it plays in establishing the theorem. In terms of
insight, it reveals how Steele’s heuristic prompted the introduction of an auxiliary sequence.
In terms of the role it plays, the sketch reveals that the sequence was chosen to make the
terms of the ai sequence more equal.
However, there is more to be said about the insight behind the ci sequence and the role
that it plays in the argument. In particular, the sketch I presented focused only on the
general strategy of introducing an auxiliary sequence—it did not say anything about the
particular choice of such a sequence. Po´lya’s full rational reconstruction addresses this as
well, but the considerations are more technical and so I omit them here.
9The terms are unequal because
∑
∞
n=1
an is assumed to be convergent.
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2.2 Discussion
Po´lya’s analysis thus highlights that we want two things from motivated proofs: (i) to be
able to identify the role of each step; (ii) to be able to identify the insight behind each step.
In section (3) I will develop these desiderata into an explication of motivated proofs before
illustrating how it is to be understood in practice by applying it to particular case studies
in sections (4) and (5). To reflect the fact that different mathematical agents will differ in
their ability to identify the role of a proof step or the insight behind it, the account that
I offer will be a relative one. More precisely, it will be relative to a given mathematical
background, which I term the context.
After elaborating on the epistemic benefits of motivated proofs in section (6), I will then
consider ways in which we can write better motivated proofs in section (7). In particular,
while Po´lya’s rational reconstruction was an effective way to motivate the unsatisfactory
proof of Carleman’s inequality, I will show that motivational efficacy can often be improved
by making more subtle changes to the proof itself. As we shall see, issues relating to how a
proof manages information are particularly important.
Before offering an explication of motivated proofs, however, I want to address potential
objections to desideratum (ii) based on its connection to mathematical discovery. For ex-
ample, it might be thought that the discovery process cannot be analyzed, and so we cannot
say much about whether a mathematical agent reading a proof can identify the insight be-
hind a given step. However, as we have already seen from Po´lya’s rational reconstruction,
it is often possible to analyze what lies behind these discoveries, and, as I will suggest in
sections (3)-(5), it is also possible to assess whether an agent with a given mathematical
background could reconstruct such reasoning.
Another potential objection to desideratum (ii) is that, being closely connected to dis-
covery, it goes beyond the purview of philosophy even if it can be analyzed. However, as
Rav has emphasized, a core function of proofs is to convey new mathematical resources:
“Proofs are for the mathematician what experimental procedures are for the experimental
scientist: in studying them one learns of new ideas, new concepts, new strategies—devices
which can be assimilated for one’s own research and be further developed” (Rav, 1999, 20).
Part of doing this successfully involves not just conveying the resources themselves, but also
information about when it is useful to try applying them. Proofs that help readers to iden-
tify the insight behind each step provide more useful information about the circumstances
under which their resources can be applied. Thus desideratum (ii) connects closely to a
core function of proofs and so should not be dismissed.
3 An Explication of Motivated Proofs
In this section I will sketch an explication of motivated proofs that incorporates the desider-
ata emphasized by Po´lya. I will build up to the notion of motivated proofs from the notion
of motivated steps. The account that I provide is thus reductionist. However there may be
other kinds of motivation that cannot be captured by a reductionist analysis and instead
require a more holistic approach. Such types of motivation may focus on, for example, a
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proof’s interestingness or its connections to other results.10 These types of motivation are
important and should also investigated, though they will not be my focus here.
Now for some preliminaries. In what follows, when I refer to a proof, I am referring to the
proof as it is written, for example, in a journal article. I will assume that the reader of the
proof is a finite mathematical agent and, consequently, has only limited cognitive resources.
Moreover, while finite agents may differ in the amount of cognitive resources they have
available, I will ignore these differences and focus instead on a typical finite agent, whose
cognitive resources are neither impoverished nor exceptional.
Further, I will assume that the reader has access to a specific mathematical “toolkit,”
which I will call the context. The context contains mathematical resources, including defini-
tions, theorems, proofs, techniques and heuristics. By techniques, I mean precise approaches
that can be applied to a variety of problems, for example the technique of completing the
square in algebra, mathematical induction in number theory, or double counting in combi-
natorics. By heuristics, I mean guidance about how to try solving problems, like Steele’s
heuristic.
Additionally, each resource comes with a range of application within which it can be
reliably applied.11,12 For example, a given resource may have a narrow range of application,
so that it can only be reliably applied in very limited circumstances, whereas a resource
with a wide range could be reliably applied even in new and unusual circumstances. A
medium range resource, then, would fall somewhere in between.
For instance, a technique concerning polynomials that has a narrow range of applica-
tion might only be reliably applied in situations which are explicitly about polynomials.
However, a technique with a wide range of application could be reliably applied even if
polynomials appear in a non-standard or unusual form. Finally, if the technique has a
medium range then it could be reliably applied even if it is not made explicit that polyno-
mials are under discussion, but not if the polynomials appear in a non-standard or unusual
form. I will illustrate these considerations with respect to a particular case study in section
(4).
Finally, in what follows I will only be considering proofs relative to contexts that allow
typical finite agents with access to them to verify that the proof is correct. This is because,
if a typical finite agent with access only to a given context cannot verify that the proof is
correct, she cannot recognize it as a proof and so it cannot be judged to be a motivated (or
indeed unmotivated) proof relative to that context.
3.1 Motivated Steps
Let’s say that an agent can identify the role a step plays in a proof if and only if she can
identify the tasks that it is intended to perform. Intended tasks can be purely logical, i.e.
instantiating logical inference rules. However, they often go beyond this and include things
10I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for highlighting the possibility of other more holistic notions of
motivation.
11I am intending “reliably applied” to be understood broadly, so as to include, for example, recognizing
when a resource is, or can be, used.
12The context could, conceivably, contain more information. It might include, for example, certain shared
conventions among practitioners, or indications that certain resources are to be preferred over others.
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like introducing useful notation, concepts or definitions, simplifying expressions, instantiat-
ing mathematical resources or “fine-tuning” them to make the argument work in just the
right way. The task that the ci sequence was intended to perform, making the terms of
the sequence the Arithmetic-Geometric Mean Inequality was applied to closer together, is
an example of such “fine-tuning.” Now let’s say that a step is role motivated relative to a
context C if and only if a typical finite agent can identify the role that it plays, i.e. if and
only if she can identify the tasks that it is intended to perform.13
Further, let’s say that an agent can identify the insight behind a proof step if and only if
she can identify where it could have reasonably come from. Sometimes steps will come from
the application of a mathematical technique. For example, if we are using the technique of
mathematical induction, we know that after we’ve proven the base case, the next step is
to assume that the induction hypothesis holds for n = k. In other words, that step comes
directly from the application of the technique of induction. Steps can also come from the
application of a heuristic, like, for example, how the ci sequence in Po´lya’s proof came
from the application of Steele’s heuristic. Sometimes steps come from chains of informal
reasoning which can be complicated and rely on a variety of mathematical resources. Now
let’s say that a step is insight motivated relative to a context C if and only if a typical finite
agent with access to C can identify the insight behind it, i.e. she can identify where it could
have reasonably come from.14
Sometimes it is very easy for a typical finite agent with access only to a given context to
identify a step’s intended tasks or where it could have reasonably come from. For example, a
step’s only intended task might be to instantiate part of a logical inference rule in a routine
way. Or it might come from the straightforward application of an available mathematical
technique. Other times, however, it requires considerably more effort to identify a step’s
intended task or where it came from. For example, in Po´lya’s proof of Carleman’s inequality,
the intended task of the ci sequence and where it came from are only revealed when we
think about what happens if we try to get by without introducing it and analyze what
happens—the proof attempt fails because the terms of the ai sequence are too far apart
and need to be made closer together so that the Arithmetic-Geometric Mean Inequality is
applied when it is (nearly) sharp.
Next let’s consider what factors affect whether a typical finite agent with access to a
given context can identify the tasks a step was intended to perform or where it could have
reasonably come from. The resources that are involved in the step’s intended tasks or where
it reasonably came from need to be available in the agent’s context and she must successfully
connect them to the proof step in question for it to be role and insight motivated. If the
necessary resources are not available, then she cannot make the connection and so the step
will fail to be role or insight motivated. If they are available but only have a narrow range
and the step’s intended task or where it comes from involve the resources in a non-standard
way, then the agent will be unable to make the connection and so the step will fail to be
13Role motivation can come in degrees. For example, an agent may be able to identify, in a general way,
a step’s intended tasks but be unable to provide full details. In such a case, the step would be partially role
motivated relative to the context.
14Insight motivation can come in degrees. For example, an agent may be able to identify, in a general
way, where a step could have reasonably come from, but be unable to provide full details. In such a case,
the step would be partially insight motivated relative to the context.
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role or insight motivated.
Now suppose that all the resources a typical finite reader needs to identify the step’s
intended task and where it could have reasonably come from are contained within the
context with wide enough range. Nonetheless her finite nature will affect whether she can
successfully identify the step’s intended tasks or where it came from. Making connections
between the proof and the resources within her context requires cognitive effort, which she
has in only limited supply. If the cost of making the connection is too high, then our finite
agent will not be able to make it and the step will fail to be role or insight motivated.
For example, a connection may be difficult to make, perhaps requiring the agent to make
other connections first, and that is why its cost is too high. Alternatively, the cost of the
connection may be too high because the proof is poorly organized or includes a slew of
irrelevant information, which makes the cost of making connections higher than it needs to
be. I will return to these factors when discussing how to write motivated proofs in section
(7).
We can also consider how role and insight motivation are related. In the discussion of
the proof of the Generalized Arithmetic-Geometric Mean Inequality in section (5) we will
see that it is sometimes possible for a step to be role but not insight motivated. Further,
in the discussion of the Cauchy-Schwarz Inequality in section (4), we will see that it is
sometimes possible for the insight behind a step to reveal its role. This raises two follow-up
questions: (i) is it sometimes possible for a step to be insight but not role motivated?; (ii)
is it sometimes possible for the role of a step to reveal the insight behind it?15 I do not
have a definite answer to these questions, but in both cases I suspect the answer is “yes.”
First consider question (i). Although we will see that sometimes the insight behind a
step involves its intended tasks and thereby reveals its role, it doesn’t seem necessary for
the insight behind a step to involve its intended tasks. For instance, perhaps the insight
behind a particular step focuses solely on what the proof looks like before its introduction,
whereas its intended tasks only come into play in the later parts of the proof. In such a
case the insight behind the step will not, in and of itself, reveal its role. Thus a reader with
acess to a suitable context could identify the insight behind the step, i.e. identify where it
could have reasonably come from, without identifying its role, i.e. its intended tasks. In
such a situation, the step would be insight but not role motivated.
Now consider question (ii). When we’re part way through proving a theorem and think-
ing about the next step to take, we might notice that if a certain task or tasks can be
completed, then the proof will also be complete. We can then use this information to (try
to) find and introduce a step that achieves these tasks. In such cases, the role of a step
plays a central part in revealing where the step came from, i.e. the insight behind it. Thus
if a reader can identify the role of the step in such a case, so long as she has access to an
appropriate context, she should also be able to identify the insight behind it.
Admittedly, some amount of vagueness remains in the notions of role and insight mo-
tivation. This is to be expected as they must be open ended to capture a wide variety of
tasks a step can be intended to perform and places a step could have reasonably come from.
However the case studies presented in sections (4) and (5) will provide further illustrations
of the terms and how they are to be applied in practice.
15I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for raising these questions.
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3.2 Motivated Proofs
We can use the notions of role and insight motivation, relative to a particular context, to
sketch an explication of what it means for a proof to be motivated: a proof is motivated
with respect to context C if and only if each of its steps are both role and insight motivated
relative to C.16 In other words, a proof is motivated relative to C if and only if a typical
finite reader with access only to C can identify the tasks each step is intended to perform
and where each step could have reasonably come from.
This explication thus makes the intuition that a motivated proof is one that doesn’t
contain any puzzling steps more precise. Specifically, the notions of role and insight moti-
vation rule out two different ways in a which a proof step could be puzzling. For instance,
a step that fails to be role motivated will cause puzzlement by leaving the reader in the
dark as to what the step is being used to accomplish. For example, a step that introduces
a clever construction that is not role motivated will elicit questions like “I see that this
works, but what, exactly, is it doing?” Similarly a step that fails to be insight motivated
will cause puzzlement by leaving the reader at a loss as to how the proof author could have
come up with it. For example, a step that sets a variable to be a certain value that makes
the proof work out perfectly but which fails to be insight motivated will be unsatisfying
and lead to questions like “What could have led the proof author to choose that value?”
The conditions of role and insight motivation are thus necessary to prevent a step from
being intuitively puzzling, as can be further appreciated from the discussion of the proof of
Carleman’s Inequality as well as the case studies in sections (4) and (5).
I do not, however, have an argument to show that the conditions of role and insight
motivation are sufficient to prevent a step from being intuitively puzzling. While the puz-
zling steps in the proofs I examine both in this paper and elsewhere (Morris, 2015) have
failed to be either role or insight motivated, it may nonetheless be possible for a step to
be both role and insight motivated yet still intuitively puzzling. If this turns out to be
the case, the definition of motivated proofs I have given above will not fully capture the
intuitive notion of motivation. To fix it, further conditions would need to be added to rule
out the additional ways in which a proof step can be puzzling. The definition proposed
above is thus best understood as a conjecture about the nature of motivated proofs. While
it’s possible that the definition is incomplete, it still provides a useful starting point from
which to characterize and analyze motivation in mathematics.
4 Case Study: The Cauchy Schwarz Inequality
To illustrate and further clarify the explication of motivated proofs just presented, I will
apply it to a case study from linear algebra: the Cauchy Schwarz Inequality.
4.1 Proof of The Cauchy Schwarz Inequality
Before stating the Cauchy Schwarz Inequality, I will first briefly review real inner product
spaces. Let V be a real vector space and 〈, 〉 a function from V × V to R satisfying the
16Note that, just as role and insight motivation can come in degrees, so too can the motivational power
of a proof.
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following conditions17 for all x, y, z ∈ V :
1. 0 ≤ 〈x, x〉 with equality if and only if x = 0.
2. 〈y, x〉 = 〈x, y〉.
3. for any α, β ∈ R 〈αx+ βy, z〉 = α〈x, z〉 + β〈y, z〉.
Then (V, 〈, 〉) is called a real inner product space. Further, given a real inner product space,
we can define a new function, || . || : V → R, called a norm, as follows: ||x|| = 〈x, x〉
1
2 .
We can now state the Cauchy Schwarz inequality for a real inner product space:
Theorem. Let (V, 〈, 〉) be a real inner product space. Then for all x, y ∈ V
|〈x, y〉| ≤ ||x|| · ||y||
with equality if and only if x and y are linearly dependent.
Consider the proof, below, which loosely follows the presentation by Deutsch (2012, 3),
though includes more details.
Proof. First suppose that x and y are linearly dependent. Then x = αy for some α ∈ R.
Thus we have
|〈x, y〉| = |〈αy, y〉| = |α〈y, y〉| = |α|||y||2 = ||αy|| · ||y|| = ||x|| · ||y||.
Now suppose that x and y are linearly independent. Then for no α ∈ R do we have
y − αx = 0. Thus for all α
0 < 〈y − αx, y − αx〉 = 〈y, y − αx〉 − α〈x, y − αx〉
= 〈y, y〉 − α〈x, y〉 − α〈y, x〉 + α2〈x, x〉
= 〈y, y〉 − 2α〈x, y〉 + α2〈x, x〉.
Now let α := <x,y>
<x,x>
. Substituting this in the above yields
0 < 〈y −
〈x, y〉
〈x, x〉
x, y −
〈x, y〉
〈x, x〉
x〉 = 〈y, y〉 − 2
〈x, y〉
〈x, x〉
〈x, y〉+
〈x, y〉2
〈x, x〉2
〈x, x〉
= 〈y, y〉 −
〈x, y〉2
〈x, x〉
.
Rearranging thus yields
〈x, y〉2
〈x, x〉
< 〈y, y〉.
Hence
〈x, y〉2 < 〈x, x〉〈y, y〉.
Finally, taking square roots of both sides,
|〈x, y〉| < ||x|| · ||y||.
17For more details on real inner product spaces, see e.g. (Steele, 2004, 7). Note that I have condensed the
5 axioms from Steele’s presentation to 3.
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4.2 Motivational Efficacy
I will focus on one step in the proof of the Cauchy Schwarz Inequality: the step in which
α is set to be <x,y>
<x,x>
. As I will describe below, this step performs a specific task within
the proof and comes from an application of Steele’s heuristic. Nonetheless, the step fails
to be role and insight motivated, relative to a particular context that I will describe later
on. This is because, while a typical agent with access only to that context can verify the
correctness of the proof, she cannot identify the step’s intended task or where it could have
reasonably come from.
First, to facilitate discussion, I am extracting and numbering the steps surrounding the
choice of α below:
For all α ∈ R, 0 < 〈y, y〉 − 2α〈x, y〉 + α2〈x, x〉 (1)
Let α := <x,y>
<x,x>
(2)
Then 0 < 〈y, y〉 − 〈x,y〉
2
〈x,x〉 (3)
To start, let’s focus on the intended task of step (2): to introduce a value of α that
minimizes 〈y, y〉 − 2α〈x, y〉 + α2〈x, x〉. That this value of α successfully performs this task
can be checked using techniques from calculus or by completing the square, since 〈y, y〉 −
2α〈x, y〉 + α2〈x, x〉 is a quadratic in α. For example, here is Steele’s demonstration via
completing the square (Steele, 2004, 57):
〈y − αx, y − αx〉 = 〈y, y〉 − 2α〈x, y〉 + α2〈x, x〉
= 〈x, x〉
(
〈y, y〉
〈x, x〉
− 2α
〈x, y〉
〈x, x〉
+ α2
)
= 〈x, x〉
{(
α−
〈x, y〉
〈x, x〉
)2
+
〈y, y〉
〈x, x〉
−
〈x, y〉2
〈x, x〉2
}
In the above, 〈x, x〉 is non-negative and 〈y,y〉〈x,x〉 −
〈x,y〉2
〈x,x〉2
is a constant. Thus to minimize
〈y−αx, y−αx〉, we need to minimize (α− 〈x, y〉/〈x, x〉)2. But this is always non-negative,
taking its minimum value of 0 when α = 〈x,y〉〈x,x〉 .
Now let’s consider where step (2) came from. First recall that we have an inequality in
step (1). Then remember Steele’s heuristic: it’s generally a good idea to apply inequalities
where they are (nearly) sharp. This supports introducing a value of α that minimizes the
right hand side of the inequality, as this will make the inequality as sharp as possible.
However, while typical agents with access only to the context C, described below, will be
able to check the correctness of the proof, they will fail to identify step (2)’s intended task
(introducing a value that minimizes a quadratic) and where it could have reasonably come
from (Steele’s heuristic). Thus, relative to this context, step (2) fails to be both role and
insight motivated and so the proof itself fails to be motivated. Let context C be described
in broad terms as follows:
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Medium range resources: Real inner product spaces (definition of a real inner
product space, definition of norm, definition of vector space, definition of linear
(in)dependence, etc); Algebra (theorem stating that the min or max of a quadratic
ax2 + bx + c occurs at −b/2a, technique of completing the square, techniques for
manipulating algebraic expressions); Logic (standard inference rules)
Missing resources: Steele’s heuristic (try to apply inequalities where they are
sharp)18
Let’s first consider whether the step in question is role motivated relative to C. There
are two ways a reader could identify the step’s intended task. The first is by connecting
the expression 〈y, y〉 − 2α〈x, y〉 + α2〈x, x〉 from step (1) and the value 〈x,y〉〈x,x〉 from step (2)
to the algebraic resources in her context. For example, the reader could recognize that this
pair have the general form ax2 + bx + c and −b/2a and then make a connection to the
theorem in her context that states that the minimum or maximum value of a quadratic
ax2 + bx + c occurs at −b/2a. This would then allow her to infer that the value of α is
chosen to minimize 〈y, y〉 − 2α〈x, y〉 + α2〈x, x〉 and she would have successfully identified
the step’s intended task.
However, a typical finite agent with access to context C cannot connect 〈y, y〉−2α〈x, y〉+
α2〈x, x〉 and the value 〈x,y〉〈x,x〉 to the quadratic resources within her context. This is because
these resources only come with a medium range, meaning they cannot be reliably applied
(or recognized as applying) when quadratics appear in a non-standard or unusual form.
Yet the quadratic in the proof does appear in a non-standard form. More precisely, three
features of the expression 〈y, y〉 − 2α〈x, y〉 + α2〈x, x〉 obscure its quadratic nature. First,
the expression uses a non-standard choice of variable, α. Second, the coefficients have a
complex form, being expressed in terms of inner products, and are written to the right of
the variable, not to the left as is standard. Third, while quadratics are standardly written
starting with the second degree term then the first degree term and finally the constant
term, this one is written in reverse. Consequently a typical finite agent cannot identify the
step’s intended task in this way.
The second way that a reader could come to identify the intended task of step (2) is
by first identifying where it could have reasonably come from. For example, if the reader
recognizes that it is a good idea to exploit the inequality 0 < 〈y, y〉 − 2α〈x, y〉 + α2〈x, x〉
where it is as sharp as possible, she can then infer that this means minimizing the right
hand side. Next, she could use the algebraic resources in her context (either the technique
of completing the square or the theorem concerning min/max values) to confirm that the
choice of α is the minimizing value and thus identify the intended task of step (2).
However, a typical finite agent with access to context C cannot identify step (2)’s in-
tended task in this way. First, Steele’s heuristic, which states that it is useful to apply
inequalities where they are as sharp as possible, is not available. Thus the reader cannot
complete the first part of the reasoning, i.e. cannot recognize that the proof should exploit
the inequality 0 < 〈y, y〉 − 2α〈x, y〉 + α2〈x, x〉 where it is as sharp as possible. Second,
18Note that this context is not “artificial” for lacking Steele’s heuristic. Steele’s heuristic is somewhat
technical and agents do not need to have it available to them in order to understand linear algebra. So,
while it may be included in sophisticated contexts, omitting in from an intermediate context like C does not
make C unrealistic.
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the quadratic 〈y, y〉 − 2α〈x, y〉 + α2〈x, x〉 still appears in non-standard form, so the reader
cannot reliably apply the quadratic resources from her context. Thus the reader cannot
complete the second part of the reasoning, either.
The considerations in the previous paragraph also show that step (2) fails to be insight
motivated relative to C. This is because, in order to identify where the step could have
reasonably come from the reader needs to apply Steele’s heuristic, but this resource is not
available within her context. Consequently, step (2) is neither role nor insight motivated
relative to C. Thus the proof fails to be motivated relative to C.
However, we can use our analysis of why the proof fails to be motivated relative to C
to improve it. There are two issues that we need to address: (i) the contextual resources
about quadratics only have a medium range of application; (ii) the contextual resources do
not include Steele’s heuristic.
Consider first the issue of the quadratic resources having only a medium range of ap-
plication. If the proof explicitly points out that 〈y, y〉 − 2α〈x, y〉 + α2〈x, x〉 is a quadratic
in α, its nature will no longer be obscured. Thus such a comment will bring the quadratic
within the range of application of the contextual resources, and so put the reader in a better
position to successfully make connections between her context and the proof. This will then
allow her to identify the intended task of step (2).
Similarly, to compensate for the fact that Steele’s heuristic is missing, the proof could
include a small remark to explain that applying the inequality where it is as sharp as possible
allows the most information to be extracted from it. The reader could then identify where
this particular value of α could have come from. Moreover, it would provide her with the
heuristic which she could then reuse in future.
More concretely, we could replace the part of the original proof in which the particular
value of α is introduced with the following:
To get the most information out of this inequality, we should apply it where it
is as sharp as possible. Thus we should apply it when the quadratic 〈y, y〉 −
2α〈x, y〉+α2〈x, x〉 takes its minimum value. So let α = 〈x,y〉〈x,x〉 and substitute this
back into the inequality . . .
This relatively minor tweak should be sufficient to significantly improve the proof’s
motivational power relative to context C.
5 Case Study: The General Arithmetic-Geometric Mean In-
equality
As another illustration of the explication of motivated proofs presented in section (3), I will
now apply it to a proof of the General Arithmetic-Geometric Mean Inequality.
5.1 Proof of the General Arithmetic-Geometric Mean Inequality
The General Arithmetic-Geometric Mean Inequality can be stated as follows (see e.g.
(Steele, 2004, 23)):
This is a preprint of an article forthcoming in The Review of Symbolic Logic.
https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755020319000583. The copyright holder is Cambridge
University Press
Theorem. Let p1, p2, . . . , pn be non-negative real numbers such that
∑n
i=1 pi = 1 and
a1, a2, . . . , an be non-negative real numbers. Then we have a
p1
1 a
p2
2 . . . a
pn
n ≤ p1a1 + p2a2 +
. . .+ pnan.
In fact, when proving this we can assume all of the pk and ak are positive. If pi = 0,
for example, we can ignore the terms corresponding to this on either side of the inequality
as they do not contribute anything. If pi 6= 0 and ai = 0 then a
p1
1 a
p2
2 . . . a
pn
n = 0 and the
inequality holds.
A proof of this inequality, which Po´lya discovered while dreaming, makes use of the
following bound for the exponential function: 1 + x ≤ ex for all x ∈ R with equality if and
only if x = 0.19 By a change of variables from x to x− 1 this becomes:
Theorem (Bound on ex−1). For all x ∈ R, x ≤ ex−1 with equality if and only if x = 1.
With this theorem in hand, we can now prove the General Arithmetic-Geometric Mean
Inequality as follows (see e.g. (Steele, 2004, 23–25), (Art of Problem Solving, n.d.)).
Proof. Let G = ap11 a
p2
2 . . . a
pn
n and A = p1a1 + p2a2 + . . . + pnan. Now define αk =
ak
A
for
1 ≤ k ≤ n. We apply the bound on ex−1 when x = αk to get αk ≤ e
αk−1, i.e.
ak
A
≤ e
ak
A
−1.
Raising to the power pk and multiplying we get(a1
A
)p1 (a2
A
)p2
. . .
(an
A
)pn
≤ exp
({
n∑
k=1
pk
ak
A
}
− 1
)
= 1.
Rearranging we obtain
ap11 a
p2
2 . . . a
pn
n ≤ A
p1+p2+...+pn ,
i.e.
G ≤ Ap1+p2+...+pn .
As p1 + p2 + . . .+ pn = 1 we thus have G ≤ A
5.2 Motivational Efficacy
As in the previous case study, I will focus only on one step in the proof of the General
Arithmetic-Geometric Mean Inequality: the step in which αk is defined to be
ak
A
. As I will
describe below, this step performs a specific task within the proof and comes from recog-
nizing that the general theorem can be reduced to a special case. Relative to a particular
context that I describe later on this step will be role, but not insight, motivated. This is
because, while a typical finite agent with access only to that context can verify the correct-
ness of the proof and identify the step’s intended task, she cannot identify where it could
have reasonably come from.
First, to facilitate discussion, I am extracting and numbering the steps surrounding the
definition of αk below:
19For a variety of different proofs of this bound, see the answers to the Math StackExchange post by
Montanaro (2013).
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Let G = ap11 a
p2
2 . . . a
pn
n and A = p1a1 + p2a2 + . . .+ pnan. (1)
Define αk =
ak
A
for 1 ≤ k ≤ n. (2)
Apply the bound on ex−1 when x = αk to get αk ≤ e
αk−1. (3)
The intended task of step (2) is relatively straightforward: to rescale the variables ak
so that
∑n
k=1 pkαk = 1. That the definition of αk achieves this is clear by inspection. The
insight behind step (2), however, is more complicated. Below I sketch Steele’s reconstruction
of how the proof could have been discovered, as this nicely illustrates where step (2) comes
from (Steele, 2004, 23–25).
Steele starts by applying the bound for ex−1 when x = ak to obtain ak ≤ e
ak−1. Raising
each side to the power pk and then multiplying the resulting inequalities he obtains
G = ap11 a
p2
2 . . . a
pn
n ≤ exp
({
n∑
k=1
pkak
}
− 1
)
= eA−1.
By applying the bound for ex−1 when x = A he also finds
A ≤ eA−1.
In other words, he has a double bound, expressed by
max {A,G} ≤ eA−1.
If A = eA−1 then the General Arithmetic-Geometric Mean Inequality will be established.
A = eA−1 when and only when A = 1, so the inequality is in fact proven for the special
case when A = 1. Steele now tries to reduce the general case to the special one.20 This can
be done by rescaling the ak so that their weighted sum is 1. Hence the introduction of the
variables αk =
ak
A
since then
∑n
k=1 pkαk = 1.
In summary, step (2) comes from recognizing that we can prove the theorem for a special
case and that we can reduce the general case to the special one by rescaling variables.
Having seen both the intended task of step (2) (to rescale the ak) and where it could
have reasonably come from (reducing the general to a special case), let us consider whether
the proof is motivated relative to the intermediate context C described below.
Medium range resources: Inequalities (techniques for working with inequalities,
e.g. rescaling variables, raising inequalities to powers, multiplying inequalities; theo-
rem for bound on ex−1); Algebra (techniques for operating with sums and products);
Problem solving (heuristics such as “Try finding a special case and reduce the general
case to the special one”); Logic (standard inference rules)
First note that a typical finite agent with access to context C will have no trouble
checking the correctness of the proof of the General Arithmetic-Geometric Mean Inequality.
Moreover, such an agent can identify the intended task of step (2): to introduce rescaled
20“Try finding a special case and reduce the general case to the special one” is a general problem solving
heuristic. Gowers (2008) briefly discusses this heuristic in connection with two examples.
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variables whose weighted sum is 1. This is because the technique of rescaling is available
within the context with medium range, and there is nothing non-standard or unusual that
would place step (2) outside of this range. This means that step (2) is role motivated
relative to C.
Step (2) fails to be insight motivated relative to C, however. Recall that we saw, above,
that step (2) comes from reducing the general case to a special one. However, to reconstruct
this, the agent must first realize that the theorem can be proven in a special case and then
figure out how to reduce the general case to the special one. Recognizing that the theorem
can be proven in a special case itself involves a number of steps: Show G ≤ eA−1; Infer
A ≤ eA−1; Infer max {A,G} ≤ eA−1; Conclude G ≤ A if A = 1. In other words, the
reasoning involved in identifying where step (2) comes from has a number of different pieces
and the agent has to complete each of them and put them together successfully. Further,
the above proof of the inequality does not provide the reader with any prompts to help her
complete these parts. Rather, she has to complete them on her own, without guidance. As
she is only a typical finite agent, however, the more parts she must complete on her own
like this, the less likely it is that she can complete them all successfully. In other words,
as the reasoning needed to identify where the step comes from involves numerous parts, it
makes it less likely that the step will be insight motivated.
Moreover, although the heuristic “Try finding a special case and reduce the general case
to the special one” is available in C, a typical finite agent won’t be able to apply it in this
case. This is because once the agent has obtained the double bound max {A,G} ≤ eA−1
she may feel as though she is at a dead end and not realize she has established the theorem
for a special case. Indeed Steele refers to the task of obtaining an inequality between G and
A from a bound on their maximum as “a modest paradox” (Steele, 2004, 24) and remarks
that a reader “might be discouraged” (Steele, 2004, 25) at this point. If the reader does not
recognize she has established the theorem for a special case, then she cannot try to reduce
the general case to it. So even if she can reconstruct the reasoning to this point, she will
not be able to complete it and so step (2) will fail to be insight motivated relative to C.
As step (2) fails to be insight motivated, the proof fails to be motivated relative to
C. However, again our analysis can help us determine how to better motivate the proof.
There were two main problems for an agent trying to determine where step (2) came from:
(i) she needed to reconstruct multiple pieces of reasoning entirely on her own, with no
guidance from the proof; (ii) part of the reasoning looked like a dead-end. These issues
can be remedied by preceding the proof with a sketch of the reconstruction of its discovery.
In fact, this is exactly how Steele (2004, 23–25) proceeds, so his version of the proof is
motivated relative to C.
6 Epistemic Benefits of Motivated Proofs
A proof that is motivated relative to a given context provides its readers (i.e. the practi-
tioners of that context) with epistemic benefits. In particular, taking ‘understanding’ in a
pre-theoretical sense, motivated proofs promote understanding, convey new mathematical
resources and stimulate new discoveries.
Mathematicians often point to understanding as the main goal of mathematics. For
example, Thurston remarked “The measure of our success is whether what we do enables
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people to understand and think more clearly and effectively about mathematics” (Thurston,
1994, 163). A proof that is motivated relative to a given context promotes understanding
among practitioners of that context by providing them with more useful information than an
unmotivated proof. More precisely, a motivated proof helps practitioners to identify (i) the
intended tasks of each step in the proof; and (ii) where each step could have reasonably come
from. This additional information enables readers to better understand how the different
proof steps work together to establish the result. Further, it promotes understanding of
the theorem itself. In particular, if a reader can identify the intended task of each step and
where they reasonably came from, she should be able to grasp why certain conditions are
included in the statement of the theorem, or whether they can be loosened, for example.21
Rav has drawn attention, as we saw in section (2.2), to the fact that a central function
of proofs is to convey new mathematical resources. Part of successfully conveying these
resources means showing how they can be used and communicating when it is useful to
apply them. Proofs that are motivated relative to a given context will be more successful
at this than unmotivated ones.22 In particular, as practitioners can identify the intended
task of each step in a motivated proof, they will better learn how the resources within the
proof can be used. By identifying where each step could have reasonably come from, the
practitioners will also be learning when it is useful to try to apply these resources in future.
Moreover, motivated proofs can sometimes directly stimulate discovery of new results.
For example, identifying a step’s intended task or where it reasonably came from can suggest
new proofs of new results.23 For a concrete example of this, consider the following toy
example: every odd integer can be represented as the difference of two squares. The proof
of this is very simple. If n is an odd integer, then we can write n = 2k +1 for some integer
k. Then we just have to notice that (k + 1)2 − k2 = 2k + 1 and the proof is complete.
The only non-trivial part of this proof is the insight behind the introduction of the
witnesses to the desired representation of n. However, here’s a rational reconstruction of
where these witnesses came from (see e.g. (Clark, 2013)): To prove the theorem, we want to
find integers x and y such that 2k+1 = x2−y2.We can rewrite this as 2k+1 = (x−y)(x+y).
Now, to try to make the left hand side of the above equation look more like the right hand
side, we can again rewrite it as 1 · (2k+1) = (x− y)(x+ y). At this point, we make a guess
to see if we can get further and try setting x− y = 1 and x+ y = 2k + 1. Then we have a
pair of simultaneous equations in two unknowns. Moreover, we find that they are solvable,
yielding x = k + 1, y = k.
Notice that part of this informal reasoning involves a guess (which is italicised). This
may prompt us to ask: are there circumstances under which it isn’t a guess? And the
answer is: yes! If p is an odd prime then its only divisors are 1 and itself. Thus (x − y)
21It is also possible for a reader to come to gain understanding of a theorem independently. In particular,
I do not mean to imply that a reader will only fully understand a theorem after reading a motivated proof.
A reader may gain understanding of a theorem by, for example, considering specific instances or special cases
of the theorem or via visualization.
22Motivated proofs thus have the instrumental benefit of promoting reuse of their resources. See (Morris,
2019) for details about reuse in mathematics.
23This means that sometimes un-motivated proofs can prompt discovery in this way because some (but
not all) steps in an unmotivated proof may be role and insight motivated relative to the given context.
However, as all steps in a motivated proof are role and insight motivated, they will prompt such discovery
more reliably than unmotivated ones.
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must be 1 and (x+ y) must be 2k + 1. Recognizing this, we may then be led to a proof of
a new result: every odd prime can be represented uniquely as a difference of two squares.
Notice that this does not hold for odd numbers generally since, for example, 15 = 82 − 72
and 15 = 42 − 12.
Motivated proofs thus provide significant benefits to the practitioners of a given context.
By promoting understanding, they help mathematicians to achieve one of their fundamental
goals. By conveying how and when to apply mathematical resources, they better serve one
of the core functions of proof. By directly stimulating discovery, they contribute to the
advancement of mathematical knowledge.
7 Writing Motivated Proofs
As motivated proofs thus have significant benefits, we should consider the more practical
matter of how we can produce them.24 To do this, we need to consider both the context
that a proof will be assessed against, and the fact that readers of the proof are finite agents
with limited cognitive resources.
In terms of the context, we need to consider whether the resources needed to identify
each step’s intended task and where each step could have reasonably come from are (i)
available in the context; (ii) associated with a wide enough range of application. If required
resources are not present in the context, then, to produce a motivated proof, the writer will
need to include additional content to make up for the missing resources. If the required
resources are present, but do not have a wide enough range of application, then the writer
will need to help the reader connect the relevant resources to the proof. The suggested
improvements to the proofs of the Cauchy Schwarz Inequality discussed in section (4) are
of this form, for example.
However, to ensure that we produce motivated proofs we also need to take into account
the fact that the reader is a finite mathematical agent, with limited cognitive resources.
Thus the proof writer should aim to make it as easy as possible for her to make connections
between the resources in her context and the proof, even if the required resources are
available and associated with a wide enough range of application. This is because, the more
effort it takes for a reader to make those connections, the more difficult it is to make them
and the less likely it is that a typical reader can identify each step’s intended task and where
it reasonably came from.
If, for example, a lengthy chain of reasoning is needed to identify a step’s intended tasks
or where it reasonably came from, the reader must make all of the connections in the chain
to do so, which will be cognitively expensive. To address this, the proof writer could include
prompts to make some of the connections for the reader, so that she does not need to make
them all by herself. Similarly, if a single connection is particularly difficult, i.e. cognitively
expensive, to make, the proof writer should add a prompt to reduce the cost of making the
connection. The suggested improvements to the proof of the General Arithmetic-Geometric
Mean Inequality discussed in section (5) are of this form, for example.
24I am not claiming that it is always possible to write motivated proofs with respect to a given context.
Some proofs may only appear motivated to agents with access to suitably sophisticated contexts and perhaps
there are proofs that are not motivated relative to any known context.
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Furthermore, the proof writer can reduce the cognitive cost of making connections by
paying close attention to how the proof manages information.25 Generally speaking, a proof
that manages information well highlights information when it is relevant and hides it when
it is not. The proof writer should consider how the proof manages information at both a
local and global level. At the local level, for example, displaying too much information can
make the proof much harder to parse than it needs to be. Making the proof harder to parse
means that it will take more effort for the reader to make connections between her context
and the proof, and thus make it less likely that the steps will be role and insight motivated.
As a concrete example, consider Wilson’s Theorem.26 This result from elementary
number theory states that if p is prime, then (p − 1)! + 1 is evenly divisible by p. The
first proof of this theorem was given by Lagrange and works by considering the polynomial
(x + 1)(x + 2) . . . (x + p − 1) and setting up a recurrence relation between its coefficients.
The recurrence relation is exploited to show that the constant coefficient plus one is evenly
divisible by p and the constant coefficient is then shown to be (p − 1)!. However, different
ways of presenting the proof can have a big effect on how easy it is to parse.
Consider, for example, the proof that starts as follows:
Proof Extract (Style 1)
Let (x+ 1)(x + 2) . . . (x+ p− 1) = xp−1 +A1x
p−2 + . . .+Ap−1
Then we have
(x+ 2)(x+ 3) . . . (x+ p) = (x+ 1)p−1 +A1(x+ 1)
p−2 + . . .+Ap−1
And so we can infer
(x+ p)(xp−1 +A1x
p−2 + . . .+Ap−1)
= (x+ 1)p +A1(x+ 1)
p−1 + . . .+Ap−1(x+ 1)
. . .
Compare this with the following, which presents the same reasoning in a different way:
Proof Extract (Style 2)
Let L(x) = (x+ 1)(x + 2) . . . (x+ p− 1)
Then we have
L(x+ 1) = (x+ 2)(x + 3) . . . (x+ p)
And so we can infer
(x+ p)L(x) = (x+ 1)L(x+ 1)
. . .
25Avigad (2018) has discussed information management in the form of modularity and Sieg (2010) has dis-
cussed the related concept of “hierarchical organization.” Additionally Avigad and Morris (2014, 2016) have
analyzed a detailed case study from the history of mathematics highlighting different forms of information
management and their importance.
26For a detailed historical case study on Wilson’s Theorem and motivation, see (Morris, 2015, §3.4).
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The second style of proof hides information when it is not relevant. More precisely, it
does not introduce the coefficients A1, A2, . . . , Ap−1 at the start of the proof, as they are
not yet needed. Removing this information, and including a handy abbreviation for the
polynomial, makes the resulting proof extract much easier to parse.
However, how the proof manages information at a more global level is also important.
In particular, if the structure of a proof is clear, then this puts the reader in a good position
to make relevant connections between the proof and her context. For example, if the proof
is split up into a series of lemmas, then seeing that step S occurs in the proof of lemma L
can help direct the reader’s search by narrowing down the connections she should consider.
This in turn can help her to more easily identify the intended task(s) of S, as well as where
it reasonably came from.
Breaking out lemmas27 from within a large complicated proof is thus one way that
a proof writer can help manage information effectively on a more global scale. Another
possible approach for complicated proofs is to provide a brief sketch or outline. This will
again provide the reader with information about the proof structure that can help guide
her search for connections and thus help her to more easily identify each step’s intended
task(s), as well as where they reasonably came from.
Ultimately, writing motivated proofs relative to a given context can be difficult. In-
deed, historical case studies document the substantial time and effort required to craft
proofs which manage information efficiently.28 Nonetheless, because motivated proofs help
disseminate and advance mathematical knowledge, it is time and effort well spent!
8 Motivation and Other Virtues
Now that we have obtained a more precise analysis of motivated proofs, we can consider
the relationship between motivational power and other desirable proof qualities. Here I will
focus on explanatory power, beauty and fit.
8.1 Explanation
The explication of motivated proofs, proposed in section (3), may invite comparisons to
explanatory proofs. For example, we might think that role and insight motivation are types
of explanation, and so conclude that a motivated proof is also explanatory. However, it is
difficult to compare motivated proofs to explanatory ones because there is little consensus
over what constitutes an explanatory proof. Indeed, mathematicians and philosophers have
strong and vastly different intuitions about which proofs are explanatory.29 Moreover, the
accounts of explanatory proofs that have been proposed are also strikingly different from
each other. For example, Steiner (1978) focused on properties of individual proofs, while
Kitcher (1989) focused on unification of a mathematical domain.
27Breaking out lemmas is one way to increase the modularity of a proof. Avigad (2018) has analyzed the
benefits of such proofs. Note that if we break out lemmas, then we must decide when and how to present
these lemmas to the readers. These issues relate directly to Sieg’s notion of “hierarchical organization” (Sieg,
2010).
28See, for example, the case study discussed by (Avigad and Morris, 2014, 2016) in which such changes
took around 100 years.
29See e.g. (Lange, 2009) for a discussion of competing intuitions over proofs by induction.
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Nonetheless, while it is difficult to make a full comparison, there do seem to be important
differences between motivated proofs and explanatory ones. Elsewhere (Morris, 2015, §5)
I have proposed certain proofs that are, according to my account, motivated with respect
to specific natural contexts but fail to be explanatory according to Steiner’s and Kitcher’s
theories. At a more general level, we can also note that theories of mathematical explanation
are not usually sensitive to whether the explanation is recognized as such by mathematicians.
However, such recognition is built into the definition of role and insight motivation—recall
that for a step to count as role or insight motivated relative to a given context, agents with
access to that context must identify the intended task of each step, as well as where each
step could have reasonably come from.
Moreover there seem to be important differences between the instrumental value of
motivated and explanatory proofs. Elsewhere (Morris, 2019) I identified reuse of resources
as an important mathematical goal and argued that explanatory proofs do not generally
help mathematicians to achieve it. However, as we have seen in section (6), motivated
proofs communicate how and when to apply mathematical resources and thus do promote
reuse of their resources.
Nonetheless, there may be a connection between motivated proofs and scientific ex-
planation.30 According to Hempel’s deductive-nomological account, an explanation shows
that the occurrence of some phenomenon was to be expected, given the specific conditions
and relevant laws (Woodward, 2017). The notion of insight motivation involves identifying
where a given step could have reasonably come from and thus seems to relate to grasping
why that step was to be expected.
The relationship between motivational and explanatory power is thus both interesting
and complicated and should be further explored.
8.2 Beauty
Although the notion of beauty, like explanation, provokes conflicting intuitions, there is a
closer connection between motivational power and beauty, at least on Cellucci’s account.
According to Cellucci “. . . a mathematical demonstration or theorem is beautiful when it
provides understanding” (Cellucci, 2015, abstract), where “understanding” is defined as
“recognition of the fitness of the parts to each other and to the whole” (Cellucci, 2015, §8,
para 3). Cellucci further explained: “There is fitness of the parts of a demonstration to
each other and to the whole when it is clear what the whole idea of the demonstration is,
what the contribution of each part of the demonstration to the whole idea is, and why such
contribution is essential” (Cellucci, 2015, §10, para 1).
The notions of role and insight motivation seem to capture some of the ways in which
proof steps can “fit” with each other and the whole demonstration in the way that Cellucci
described. Further, as readers of a motivated proof, relative to a given context, can identify
the intended task(s) of each step, as well as where each step could have reasonably come
from, they would thus recognize their fit. Consequently, it appears that a motivated proof,
relative to a suitable natural context, is also beautiful on Cellucci’s account.
30I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for pointing out this connection.
This is a preprint of an article forthcoming in The Review of Symbolic Logic.
https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755020319000583. The copyright holder is Cambridge
University Press
8.3 Fit
We have already seen, in the discussion of beauty, that there is a close relationship between
motivated proofs and “fit.” Raman-Sundstro¨m and O¨hman (2018) have analyzed fit in its
own right and have identified three general kinds, each of which has two subtypes: direct
fit (coherence, specificity); presentational fit (level of detail, transparency); and familial fit
(generality, connectedness). Their notion of transparency seems most related to motivated
proofs. Indeed, Raman-Sundstro¨m and O¨hman described transparency in the following
terms “In a proof that is strong in this criterion, it is easy to see ‘what is going on.’ In other
words, the structure of the proof is natural for the particular argument and there is no deus
ex machina component” (Raman-Sundstro¨m and O¨hman, 2018, 5). They further explained
that “. . . if a proof is transparent, a reader with the appropriate background should be in
an ideal position to grasp the ideas of the proof” (Raman-Sundstro¨m and O¨hman, 2018, 5).
As readers of a motivated proof, relative to a suitable context, can identify each step’s
intended task(s), as well as where each step could have reasonably come from, it should
indeed be easy for them to grasp “what is going on.” Consequently, motivated proofs also
appear to be transparent. However, perhaps it is possible to grasp “what is going on” in
a proof without all of its steps being role or insight motivated. For example, perhaps it
is possible to understand the core ideas of a proof and have a high level grasp of “what
is going on” within it while still finding a few steps involving the technical details to be
puzzling. If so, then it is possible for there to be proofs which are transparent but fail to
be fully motivated.
9 Concluding Remarks
In this paper I have offered a context-sensitive explication of motivated proofs. Recall from
section (3) that a proof is motivated relative to a given context if and only if each step is
both role and insight motivated relative to the context. In other words, a proof is motivated
relative to a given context if and only if a reader with access to that context can identify the
tasks each step was intended to perform, as well as where each step could have reasonably
come from. This explication thus reflects the intuition that motivated proofs are those
which do not contain any “puzzling” steps, as role and insight motivation rule out potential
sources of confusion for the reader. Moreover, as we saw in section (6), such proofs have
three main epistemic benefits: (i) they promote understanding; (ii) they successfully convey
new mathematical resources; (iii) they stimulate new discoveries. Ultimately, then, such
proofs serve to disseminate and advance mathematical knowledge among practitioners of a
given context.
However, there may be other, alternative definitions of motivated proofs that are of
interest. For example, while the account I have developed here is reductionist, it may be
possible to give an alternative, holistic, definition focusing on how interesting a proof is
or how it connects to other areas of mathematics. Further, mathematicians often speak
of proofs which are, for example, “geometrically motivated” (Sherali, 1987) or “physically
motivated” (Halliwell, 2014). Proofs which are motivated in these ways are worthy of
investigation in their own right.
Moreover, while I have focused on motivated proofs here, other mathematical artifacts
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are often said to be motivated. For example, mathematicians call attention to definitions
and theories which are (or fail to be) well motivated. Here are two examples:
It is well known that not all algorithms are feasible; whether an algorithm is fea-
sible or not depends on how many computational steps this algorithm requires.
The problem with the existing definitions of feasibility is that they are rather
ad hoc. Our goal is to use the maximum entropy (MaxEnt) approach and get
more motivated definitions (Cooke et al., 1998, 25)
Starting from a small number of well-motivated axioms, we derive a unique
definition of sums with a noninteger number of addends. (Mu¨ller and Schleicher,
2011)
This suggests that it may be of interest to develop an account of motivational power
that applies to these artifacts as well. Indeed, there will likely be connections between the
accounts themselves, as well as between accounts of other virtues. I have already discussed,
in section (8), the relationship between motivated proofs, explanatory power, beauty and fit.
Developing accounts of motivated definitions and theories may reveal further connections
to virtues such as fruitfulness, which has been analyzed by Tappenden (2008) and Yap
(2011). Finally, given the close connection between mathematics and science, the notions
of motivated mathematical artifacts may generalize so as to apply to scientific concepts and
theories. Consequently the work presented here is just the beginning of an investigation
into motivational power.
However, it is not just philosophical work that remains to be done. Investigation into the
topic of motivated proofs, and motivated mathematical and scientific artifacts more gener-
ally, should be highly interdisciplinary, incorporating insights from, for example, philosophy,
history, psychology and education.
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